IRF Committee on Road Safety

  • Co-Chairman: Chris Sanders (Lindsay Transportation Solutions)
  • Co-Chairman: Ron Faller (Midwest Roadside Safety Facility)

In order to combat the growing epidemic of road fatalities and injuries on roads around the world, IRF Members have organized as a Committee to address road safety needs around the world. More specifically, the volunteer-based IRF Committee on Road Safety was formed to conduct activities aiding in the reduction of road fatalities and serious injury accidents using various means, programs and policy statements.

Connect with the Committee on

LinkedIn-logo-wide

The goals of the Committee are to:

  • Garner road safety expertise, including best practices and newest technologies, through technology transfer from the international community, in order to prepare and support road safety programs, policy statements and positions;
  • Educate government agencies (i.e. transportation, health, etc.), road authorities, consulting organizations and other associations on the use of new design methods, proven technologies and cost-effective practices;
  • Influence key decision-makers to implement successful road safety strategies/programs, as well as support road safety research;
  • Identify focus areas where significant improvements in road safety and mobility can be achieved; and
  • Encourage a better understanding of the safe interaction between key elements of the road system: the driver, the vehicle and the road infrastructure

Members of the IRF Committee on Road Safety will be able to effect real change in the world. This is a great opportunity to have an attentive audience of key decision-makers who will hear the voice of the industry and listen to your counsel.

IRF Road Safety Subcommittees

Subcommittee on Roadside Safety Features

  • Chairman: Akram Abu-Odeh (Texas A&M Transportation Institute)

Subcommittee on Intersection/Roundabout

  • Chairman: Mr. Aiken Jiantong NI (AEIOsoft Mobility & Road Safety Laboratory)

Subcommittee on Enforcement

  • Co-Chairman: Mr. Philip Wijers (Sensys/Gatso)
  • Co-Chairman: Dr. Benjamin Colucci (University of Puerto Rico)

Subcommittee on Work Zones and Temporary Traffic Control Safety

  • Co-Chairman: Pete Johnson (3M)
  • Co-Chairman: Dr. Ahmed Aburahmah (The City of San Diego)

Subcommittee on Driver Behavior, Education and Training

  • Co-Chairman: Mr. Dino Kalivas (Emirates Driving Company)
  • Co-Chairman: Mr. David Wallace (Traffic Safety Guy)

Subcommittee on Motor-Vehicle Equipment

Subcommittee on Vulnerable Users

Resolutions & Endorsements

Roadside Safety Hardware Harmonization (January 14, 2008)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Roadside Safety Hardware Harmonization”

March 23, 2011

Although the International Road Federation Washington (IRF) has not conducted its own investigation, the IRF has reviewed and now endorses the Resolution on Roadside Safety Hardware Harmonization that was approved by the Transportation Research Board’s AFB20(2) Roadside Safety Design Subcommittee on International Research Activities on January 14, 2008. The resolution is shown below:

The AFB20(2) Roadside Safety Design Subcommittee on International Research Activities recommends that road authorities in all countries should only specify roadside safety hardware, i.e. longitudinal safety barriers, crash cushions, terminals and transitions that has met either NCHRP 350 or EN 1317 criteria (or their updates)

###

Turned Down Ends (March 23, 2011)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“End Turned Down Ends”

March 23, 2011

Although the International Road Federation Washington (IRF) has not conducted its own investigation, the IRF has reviewed and now endorses the Resolution on Traffic Barrier Ends “END Turned-Down ENDs” that was approved by the Transportation Research Board’s AFB20(2) Roadside Safety Subcommittee on International Research Activities on January 24, 2011. The resolution is shown below:

“Turned Down Terminals were developed and introduced in the 1960’s to eliminate spearing of the rail into the passenger compartment of the impacting vehicle that often occurred with the “Fishtail” or “Spoon” full height, stand-up ends. While Turned Down Terminals were an improvement over the “Fishtail” or “Spoon” Terminals, both field experience and full scale crash testing have shown that vehicle roll over or launching is likely with Turned Down Terminals under high speed impact conditions.
Based on observed crash test performance and reported field experience, the AFB20 (2) Subcommittee recommends that road authorities in all countries immediately prohibit new installations of “Fishtail” or “Spoon” Terminals as well as Turned Down Terminals on the approach end of concrete barriers or steel beam guardrails on roads with operating speeds in excess of 80 km/h unless these ends are outside the defined clear zone and in other locations where end-on high speed impacts are unlikely to occur or otherwise shielded from potential impacts.

It is understood that system-wide replacement of existing Turned Down Ends or Fishtail or Spoon Terminals, while beneficial, may not be practical or economically feasible. For new Terminal installations at these locations road authorities should only specify the use of crashworthy Terminals that have met appropriate testing criteria such as NCHRP 350, MASH or EN 1317 (or their updates). During any road construction Restoration, Rehabilitation and Resurfacing Projects (3R), existing Terminals should be updated with Terminals that meet NCHRP 350, MASH or EN 1317 (or their updates) criteria.

Turned Down Terminals and Fishtail Terminals remain appropriate for trailing (downstream) ends of traffic barriers on divided highways and in other locations where end-on high speed impacts are unlikely to occur.”

The International Road Federation recognizes the importance for using crash- tested, state- of- the- art safety hardware, and advocates the immediate implementation of this resolution to make roads safer around the world.

###

Cable Barrier and Motorcycle Safety (July 1, 2011)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Cable Barriers and Motorcycle Safety”

July 1, 2011

Although the International Road Federation Washington (IRF) has not conducted its own investigation, the IRF has reviewed and now endorses the Resolution on Traffic Barrier Ends “END Turned-Down ENDs” that was approved by the Transportation Research Board’s AFB20(2) Roadside Safety Subcommittee on International Research Activities on January 24, 2011. The resolution is shown below:

Longitudinal barriers are doing an excellent job protecting motorists from roadside hazards. However, due to the lesser degree of crash protection inherent in motorcycle use, longitudinal barriers may present a greater risk of injury to motorcyclists impacting the face of a steel beam or cable guardrail as well as, concrete parapets, depending on the speed and angle of the impact event. Motorcycle fatalities or serious injuries can occur when a fallen motorcyclist leaves the motorcycle and contacts the roadway surface or when he or she slides into a nearby concrete barrier or steel barrier system and strikes the barrier, including the steel beams, cables and support posts. Riders who drive into a barrier can also be injured as they slide along the top of barrier.

The Transportation Research Board’s AFB20(2) Roadside Safety Design Subcommittee on International Research agrees that potentially all barriers could represent a greater risk of injury to motorcyclists than to other motorists, AFB20(2) also supports both the quantification of this risk and efforts by safety barrier manufacturers to develop systems that can lessen the risk and the severity of injuries to motorcyclists who come into contact with these devices while continuing to provide devices that perform safely for other motor vehicles.

Safety products are available to reduce the likelihood of impacts or reduce the severity of impacts between fallen motorcyclists and support posts used in steel beam and cable longitudinal barriers. The AFB20(2) Roadside Safety Design Subcommittee on International Research recommends that road authorities consider the use of these products at sites that have a history of motorcycle accidents and where such products would be a cost effective method to reduce the risk of serious injury when riders impact barrier posts. The AFB20(2) Subcommittee supports the recommendations in the EuroRAP document: "Barriers to Change: Designing Safe Roads for Motorcyclists" in particular the summary statement on page 13 that states "The Panel concludes that, despite the amount of high profile coverage that wire rope barriers have attracted, limited research does not warrant the inference that they are more or less dangerous than other types of barrier on the market.

The AFB20(2) Subcommittee supports the initiative to conduct further research through NCHRP Project 22-26. The subcommittee also supports efforts under way in Europe to include aspects of motorcyclist protection in the current CEN testing standards.

###

Driver Training (November 7, 2013)

from the Driver Behavior, Education and Training Subcommittee

Although the International Road Federation (IRF) has not conducted its own investigation, the IRF has reviewed and now endorses the concept detailed in the attached paper. This position is based upon extensive supporting documentation regarding the inadvisability of any training programs that teach drivers how to respond in emergency situations, including research by Elvik, et al (2009), Gregersen (1996), and Mayhew and Simpson (2002). [An excerpt from]the endorsement is contained below: [Download the full endorsement] Training programs aimed at enhancing the skills to regain control in emergency situations should not be included in basic driver education nor in post‐test driver training programs. The learned skills from such training programs erode quickly, and the noted training programs result in more risk taking due to driver overconfidence. Basic driver education and post‐test driver training should be aimed at improving the calibration skills of both learner drivers and novice drivers. Well‐calibrated drivers can detect latent hazards in traffic situations, do not underestimate the likelihood that these hazards will cause adverse effects (i.e. they are aware of the risks), and do not overestimate their own skills (i.e. they are aware of their own limitations).

Enhancing Driver Skills through Training Programs (January 14, 2014)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Enhancing Driver Skills through Training Programs”

January 14, 2014

Although the International Road Federation (IRF) has not conducted its own investigation, the IRF has reviewed and now endorses the concept detailed in the attached paper. This position is based upon extensive supporting documentation regarding the inadvisability of any training programs that teach drivers how to respond in emergency situations, including research by Elvik, et al (2009), Gregersen (1996), and Mayhew and Simpson (2002). The resolution is contained below:

Training programs aimed at enhancing the skills to regain control in emergency situations should not be included in basic driver education nor in post‐test driver training programs. The learned skills from such training programs erode quickly, and the noted training programs result in more risk taking due to driver overconfidence. Basic driver education and post‐test driver training should be aimed at improving the calibration skills of both learner drivers and novice drivers. Well‐calibrated drivers can detect latent hazards in traffic situations, do not underestimate the likelihood that these hazards will cause adverse effects (i.e. they are aware of the risks), and do not overestimate their own skills (i.e. they are aware of their own limitations).

###

Download the full policy statement

Road-Markings (January 15, 2014)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Road Markings”

January 14, 2014

Although the International Road Federation (IRF) has not conducted its own investigation, the IRF has reviewed and now endorses the concept outlined below. This position is based upon extensive supporting documentation regarding the need for adequate and effective road markings on roads around the world. These road markings not only should be used on new roads butevery effort should be made to ensure these road markings are properly maintained. The resolution is contained below:

Road markings are one of the most cost-effective safety solutions that are available to policymakers and road owners. They provide drivers with much needed guidance on the road allow for better preview time and can significantly help avert the risks of run-off-road accidents and head-collisions. Nevertheless, as a result of budget cuts implemented by governments in some countries in recent years, the quality of road markings around the world has deteriorated significantly and in some cases, they have even disappeared altogether.

“The systematic under-maintenance of roads and road markings in particular represents first and foremost a hazard for the road user,” explains George Lee, Chairman of the ERF Working Group on Road Markings. “There is a plenty of empirical evidence and research findings that proves that road markings greatly increase driver comfort and can produce significant first year rates of return for road authorities’.

In addition, and as outlined by EuroRAP and EuroNCAP in their consultation paper launched in November 2013, the absence of visible road markings also essentially negates the large potential safety benefits that can arise from the introduction of Lane Departure Warning Systems in new vehicles. Many of the current Lane Departure Warning Systems rely on clear road markings to calculate the vehicle’s position on the road.

In the United States, the paper “The Benefits of Pavement Markings: A Renewed Perspective Based on Recent and Ongoing Research” concludes that “There are many advances underway. Pavement marking technologies are producing more durable markings, brighter markings, and markings that continue to retro reflect even during rainy conditions. Agencies are continuing to use pavement markings on rumble strips for added visibility and durability. Many agencies are developing successful pavement marking management tools that include innovative performance measures. The specifications for pavement markings are also evolving to accommodate new technologies and innovative pavement marking management practices. These efforts, and others, have been shown to be effective. As noted earlier, the Missouri Department of Transportation has seen a 25 percent reduction in lane departure crashes since implementing policies to help keep drivers on the road.”
The solution is to establish intervention and maintenance standards that can ensure markings remain visible at all time, both to the driver and the intelligent vehicle irrespective of light conditions (day vs night), weather conditions (dry vs wet vs wet and rainy) and age (young vs old).

“We believe that this can be summarized by the simple 150x150. In other words, road markings should have a minimum performance 150 mcd/lux/m² and a minimum width of 150 mm for all roads. For wet and rainy conditions the minimum performance level should be 35 mcd/lux/m² (RW2),” explains George Lee.

“We know that this is feasible from a technological point of view and believe that any additional costs will be more than compensated by better increased safety levels and reduction in accidents. This is why this proposal has been endorsed by a wider range of stakeholders. Thus, what we are calling for is for road authorities around the world to upgrade their road marking practices and for European Member States in particular to honour their pledge made at Leipzig Summit and to allocate to road administrations sufficient funds to keep Europe’s roads safe.”

###

Children and Road Safety (April 30, 2015)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Children and Road Safety”

April 30, 2015

On April 10, 2014, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly requested the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN regional commissions to facilitate organization of the Third UN Global Road Safety Week in 2015. The Week will be held May 4-10, 2015 under the theme “children and road safety”. The aim of the week will draw attention to the urgent need to better protect children and generate action on the measures needed to do so.

According to WHO, 186,300 children die each year from road traffic crashes around the world – equivalent to 500 children every day or one every three minutes. Many more are injured, often severely. In fact, road traffic injury ranks among the top four causes of death & serious injury for all children over the age of five years. These traumatic events cause immeasurable suffering and grief, and at times economic hardship for families and friends. In addition, they cost societies precious resources, diverting these from other pressing health and development challenges.

The International Road Federation (IRF) fully associates itself to the aims and objectives of the 3rd UN Road Safety Week and, as a member of the UN Road Safety Collaboration, commends the leadership of the World Health Organization in drawing attention to this important issue. IRF considers that road-related traffic injuries are not an inevitable by-product of rising motorization and has recognized successful campaigns to tackle child deaths on our roads through holistic measures covering education, training, change in legislation, and infrastructure enhancements.

On the occasion of the 3rd UN Road Safety Week, IRF’s Driver Behavior, Education & Training Subcommittee (IRF-DBET) has endorsed a statement outlining good practices in the field of road safety education programs in the school curriculum:

An effective road safety education program involves teaching children and young people to be safer road users. It does so by developing:
1. Knowledge and understanding of road traffic and the environment in which it is found;
2. Behavioral skills necessary to survive in the presence of road traffic;
3. An understanding of students’ own responsibilities for keeping themselves and others safe; and
4. Knowledge of the causes and consequences of road accidents.

IRF-DEBT supports road safety education in schools that promote pre-learner driver education programs that are:
• Designed to fit within the school curriculum, are developmentally appropriate and delivered at different time points through a student’s school life rather than one-off events, talks and forums;
• Interactive and encourage students to develop social competence and resilience rather than purely information based programs;
• Part of a whole school approach including road safety policies and teacher support and training;
• Designed to engage with school parents and the local community given the vital role they play; and
• Enhanced by measures to increase school connectedness among students and their parents.

***

Public Private Partnerships in Traffic Enforcement (July 2, 2015)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Public Private Partnerships in Traffic Enforcement”

July 2, 2015

In most countries traffic enforcement cameras and other equipment are purchased, owned, and operated by government organizations. The past two decades have seen a wide-ranging wave of privatizations and introduction of public private partnerships (PPP) in formerly government-owned or controlled activities, including traffic enforcement. Implementing this concept requires a set of principles and good practices presented in this IRF policy statement.

An Effective Automated Traffic Enforcement PPP Model needs at a minimum these basic elements:

• A study to identify the intersections or road sections that have a history of injuries or fatalities with the goal to improve road safety at these sites. The study should confirm that alternative road safety countermeasures have been considered and evaluated before the decision to install cameras is made.

• A private party, either a supplier or a third party who is willing to supply the cameras at no up-front charge to the public party, which could be a municipality, county, state, or nation, and provide a service to issue tickets and collect fines.

• The private party agrees to recover its investment over time by receiving a negotiated percentage of the fines revenue with a “capped” or maximum monthly or annual payment to the private party established between the public and private party. This cap should not prevent the private party from issuing tickets after this cap is reached, which means a reasonable per ticket fee only to cover the private party’s additional costs should continue after reaching this cap.

• No citations may be issued unless an authorized official has verified the offense after viewing the image or video of the incident.

• An independent third party must be hired to approve, routinely inspect, verify and calibrate each camera and the processes to confirm the intended performances.

• A clearly publicized campaign that promises that all revenue above the private parties’ (camera supplier and operator as well as the third party hired to audit the cameras and processes on an annual basis) agreed to expenses that is generated from fines will be reinvested only in road safety related projects.

***

Appendix 1:
Public Private Partnerships in Traffic Enforcement

Abstract
In most countries traffic enforcement cameras and other equipment are purchased, owned, and operated by government organisations. Back-offices, where violation data are processed, citations issued, and traffic fines collected, have traditionally been government run activities. The past two decades have seen a wide-ranging wave of privatisations and introduction of public private partnerships (PPP) in formerly government owned or controlled activities, including traffic enforcement. Implementing this concept means that not a government body, but rather a private party invests and installs enforcement equipment (e.g. speed or red-light cameras). Back office processing (i.e. sending out violation notices and fine collection) is also often carried out by a private party. The investment in systems and related processing and support activities are funded by the fine revenue collected over the contract term. Gaining support, and ultimately acceptance, from the public for these projects is crucial. That is why transparency, publicity and communication are key factors for successful implementation. Therefore, some jurisdictions also elect to subcontract ‘publicity and communication’ to private parties. A government task or service that is funded and operated through a partnership of a public sector authority and private sector company is typically referred to as a Public Private Partnership (PPP).
These full service PPPs are often organised on a municipal level in close consultation with the local administration and police. Due to the high initial investment and gradual repayment, such PPP’s are typically based on longer term contracts. Moreover, the regulatory environment may require some changes to allow involvement of a private party. One process that is difficult to outsource is the formal confirmation of a violation by a review of the photo or video evidence. This can only be done by an authorised government official such as a police officer. Depending on laws and regulations, there could be more issues that may limit the extent of the private party’s involvement in these PPP’s.
When properly implemented, PPP’s in traffic enforcement can considerably contribute to the reduction of casualties, injuries and crashes, as well as, improve traffic flow, and increase quality of life with more safety, lower emissions and less noise pollution. In addition to road safety measures, personal injury and death on roadways have a significant impact on the economy through medical costs, lost wages and disability pay outs. These costs are estimated by the WHO to be 1 – 3% of a country’s GNP.

I. Introduction
Traffic enforcement cameras and related equipment are typically purchased, owned and operated by government organisations. Back-offices, where violation data are processed, citations issued and traffic fines collected, have traditionally been government run, as well. Why should cash strapped governments invest in such systems if private parties, specializing in these businesses, can do it better, with more flexibility and at lower costs? Would a Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement for traffic enforcement with local governments/police make sense? The same applies to back office processing of violations where considerable economies of scale can be realised. If there is no precedent in enforcement by private parties, some regulatory changes may be required to allow involvement by private parties. How such enforcement PPPs organised and what are the advantages and potential bottlenecks?
A proposed model for an effective Traffic Enforcement PPP should at a minimum include the following elements:
1) A study to identify the intersections or road sections that have a history of injuries or fatalities with the goal to improve road safety at these sites, as well as confirmation that alternative road safety countermeasures have been considered and evaluated before the decision to install cameras was made.

2) A private party willing to supply the cameras at no up-front charge to the public party, which could be a municipality, county, state, or nation.

3) An agreement that the private party will recover its investment over time with a “capped” or maximum monthly or annual payment to the private party established between the public and private party. This payment will include the private party’s overhead, investment costs, and reasonable profit for the venture. This cap should not prevent the private party from issuing tickets after this cap is reached, which means a reasonable per ticket fee only to cover the private party’s additional overhead costs should continue beyond this cap. The purpose of this cap is to curtail potential tampering and bogus tickets that create unwarranted revenues.

4) An understanding that no citation will be issued unless an authorised official has verified the offense after viewing the image or video of the incident.

5) An independent third party that is hired to routinely, but at least once a year, verify, calibrate and inspect the cameras and the processes to verify their intended performances.

6) A clearly publicized campaign that promises that all revenue above the private parties’ agreed to expenses that is generated from fines will be reinvested by the public parties in road safety related projects and/or e.g. in children’s education projects.

7) Unforeseen and mutually agreed to costs in connection with the PPP such as legal cost, vandalism, etc. to be defined and covered as overhead costs.

8) Yellow light cycles should be based on engineering studies, best practices and consultations with local authorities that take into account variables such as the size and layout of the intersection as well as the prevailing speed limit at the crossing.

9) Pedestrian countdown timers could be installed at all intersections with cameras. These timers give the motorists a good indication of how much time they have before the light will change. This will allow the motorists to adjust their speeds and should reduce the number of sudden stops prior to the intersection.

II. Concept and scope
The scope of the enforcement process starts with the violation registration and could end in court. However, in most cases, it is settled early with the payment of a fine and/or penalty points on a driver’s license. For PPPs in traffic enforcement, the registration component of this process is covered by the procurement and installation of enforcement cameras by a private party. This private party could also be a consortium consisting of e.g. a financier, back office operator and hardware supplier or BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) organisation that sees managing such processes as its core business. When the registered violations are digitally transferred to a back office, the scope can vary. Certain legal restrictions may apply e.g. the confirmation of a violation by a sworn officer or official. Technically, however, private parties can handle the entire back-office process including the collection of fines and preparation of court documents for overdue or contesting violators. However, depending on the wishes of the authorities, the private - public ‘cut’ can be made at any practical point in the back office process.
An essential issue with any enforcement activity and especially with PPPs is the motto: ‘No enforcement without publicity’. Every authority should deal with this issue before the enforcement programme is started, and preferably at the time when enforcement plans are made public by the authority in question. The key issue with publicity is transparency toward the public such as 1) where and why the authorities are implementing the enforcement activities at certain locations, 2) what the results are, 3) what happens to the fine revenue, and 4) what is the (financial) role of the private party. A large part of this publicity can be carried out by the private party on behalf of the local authorities.

III. Organization
The two public parties, the political authority and the enforcement authority, need to have a basic agreement before any private parties can be invited into the process. The police are keenly aware of the trouble spots in the road network, which have seen serious crashes in recent years. Besides cameras, and depending on the situation, other road safety measures may also be effective, such as reduced speed limits, speed humps, electronic speed displays, and publicity campaigns. Often traffic engineers, employed by the local jurisdiction, handle such decisions. On the political side, road safety needs to be viewed as serious issue. If not, projects will falter, especially contentious projects, such as PPP’s in enforcement. The objectives should always be improvements in road safety, saving lives, and improving the quality of life.
A public party that implements a PPP enforcement program with a financial objective based on fine revenue from the enforcement PPP will soon face the wrath of the public, who will see the PPP enforcement program as a revenue-generating program and not a road safety program. As such, the PPP enforcement program will be very likely to fail. All surplus fine revenue received by the public parties beyond the “capped or/and agreed upon” fees for the private party should be reinvested in road safety related or children’s education projects by the public parties. This mechanism keeps the whole process transparent and clean.
It is also important that the private party is operating in the background and that most interaction with the public is taking place on behalf of the authorities. For example, citations would be sent out on the letterhead of the responsible authority. The PPP parties also need to agree upon a well-defined process on how to deal with unpaid fines and challenges that may need legal action.

IV. Transparency and publicity
As mentioned, transparency and publicity are key requirements for successful PPPs in traffic enforcement. This starts with the initial political discussions on how to improve road safety. But also applies to the type approval and annual verification of the cameras by an independent party not related to the PPP. In some countries e.g. the United States such parties may not exist. Violators should be able to see their violation photo and data on-line and should also have access to the type approval and annual verification certificates for the cameras that registered their violation. For example, it should also be made very clear to any violator 1) what the violation process includes, 2) what happens in case of late payment, 3) which laws apply and which rights the violator has, 4) where fine revenues will be reinvested, 5) how challenges can be made, and 6) why enforcement is taking place at that particular location.
Residents have to understand the background and benefits of enforcement and need to be continuously informed about the results in terms of reduced casualties, injuries, and crashes as well as better quality of life due to increased road safety, improved mobility, and less noise and pollution. This prevents drivers and residents from perceiving such enforcement PPPs as simply tax or revenue generation programmes. The scope of this publicity task could even be expanded to a more holistic road safety responsibility which also includes other aspects e.g. prevention of alcohol and drug use while operating a vehicle, infrastructural road safety improvements - all financed with fines paid by violators.
Being transparent and communicating about the entire enforcement process serves several purposes. It encourages early payments, and reduces (costly) challenges, and prevents the enforcement PPP from being seen as a cash cow for the authorities, or even worse for the private party. For efficiency and credibility, legal procedures resulting from challenges to citations should remain at an absolute minimum. Publicity for the road safety objectives, integrity of enforcement equipment and transparency of back-office processes towards violators, drivers and the public are required to create and maintain public support in traffic enforcement PPP programmes.

V. Challenges and opportunities
A potential challenge with enforcement PPPs is the fact that residents, drivers, politicians, administrators, and the police may be reluctant to see a former government task that involves fines, punishment and potential profits in the hands of a private party. Politicians and administrators may fear a political backlash. The police could be reluctant to cede with part of their enforcement task. Residents and drivers may see fines as an additional tax and unjust profits for a private party. Discussion, transparency and publicity should neutralise most of these concerns.
On the other hand there are many advantages to enforcement PPPs. Enforcement equipment and back offices are capital intensive and expensive to operate for cash strapped governments. Back-office staff, overhead, funds, police, and other resources involved in enforcement can be used for other relevant projects. Economies of scale can be obtained, such as by working with a common back-office for multiple jurisdictions, specialist management, and operators, processing of other violations (e.g. parking), and use of the latest equipment and software applications with a predictable long-term cost structure. Governments can benefit from flexibility, competition and market pricing as operators can be changed at the end of the contact term. Moreover, in jurisdictions with police integrity issues, better operational and accounting transparency can be realised.
A funding structure whereby the private party is paid an unlimited fixed fee for each citation issued is contentious and politically sensitive. A fixed monthly fee per camera might not be ideal; since, there is no incentive for a private party to process tickets and collect fines over the monthly fee. Depending on the circumstances, the best system may be a fixed ‘basic fee’ per collected fine for the private party up to a certain maximum fee limit per camera, and over this limit a relatively lower ‘surplus fee’ per collected fine. This allows the private party to cover variable cost while maintaining the incentive to continue to issue tickets. The surplus fee also provides the public party with more revenue per collected fine and thus benefits public acceptance.

Public parties should also consider all potential legal, administrative, and operational bottlenecks prior to implementation. Governments and/or the police should have the right to relocate a certain number of cameras during the contact term should road safety objectives be achieved at certain camera locations. Further, they should also maintain control over other road safety enhancements. Crash statistics and speed profiles at locations where cameras are removed should be actively monitored for pre/post comparisons, evaluation purposes and corrective actions. Government authorised or independent parties (e.g. notified bodies) should be used for type approval and calibration. This prevents tampering and gives the court an impartial yardstick should violations be legally challenged. Private parties often have experience with these issues and could consult on these issues. Fine levels and other disincentives (e.g. penalty points) should be set at levels that they are viewed as a just, balanced and effective deterrent by drivers. Other key issues include e.g. 1) KPI selection to measure performance, road safety effects and a related bonus-malus system, and 2) Rights of each party (government, public, police, private parties) including extent of business risk, integrity of the private party and operational on/off control over camera’s.
Automated traffic enforcement PPPs can be an effective road safety measure provided certain conditions are met, especially if government budgets are tight or if there is no administrative experience with automated enforcement.
Due to unique national, state and local legislation and conditions for each enforcement PPP, there is no one size fits all solution. Other activities besides enforcement including education and engineering initiatives should also be considered. For governments the main challenge is to balance the following interests which converge in these PPP projects: road safety, public acceptance and the business interests of private parties. The key to success is a strong focus on road safety improvement and saving lives, transparency in the various PPP processes, and ample on-going publicity about the objectives and results of the enforcement programme.

###

Further reading:
Allsop, R. (2010 / 2013). The Effectiveness of Speed Cameras. RAC Foundation http://www.racfoundation.org . London, United Kingdom.
Nouvier, J. et al. (2006). Speed Management. OECD/European Conference of Ministers of Transport www.internationaltransportforum.org . Paris, France.
Wilson C., Willis C., Hendrikz J.K., Le Brocque R., Bellamy N. (2010). Speed cameras for the prevention of road traffic injuries and deaths. The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, The Cochrane Library 2010 http://www.cochranelibrary.com , Issue 10, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom.

Setting Ambitious Road Safety Requirements (January 27, 2015)

STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the International Road Federation

“Setting Ambitious Road Safety Requirements”

January 27, 2015

The International Road Federation recognizes the significant role of the World Bank and other regional Multilateral Development Banks in influencing quality standards for road infrastructure and the broader transport system across all the countries where they operate. By the end of the United Nations Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, it is estimated these institutions will collectively have invested well over US $100 billion in road infrastructure programs across hundreds of individual projects, representing a considerable opportunity to introduce or strengthen risk management practices from the design stage.

The following statement has been prepared by the IRF as an endorsement of two recent publications Making Roads Safer - Learning from the World Bank's Experience and MDB Road Safety Guidelines.

The International Road Federation recognizes that the global road safety crisis is a complex development issue that requires coordinated and sustained responses across all five pillars of the Global Plan for the Decade of Action. The IRF also considers that safe road infrastructure is a highly cost-effective pathway to the goal of achieving a 50 percent reduction in fatal traffic injuries by 2020.

Emerging economies are rapidly renovating and expanding their road networks to accommodate growing domestic trade and mobility needs. These new roads have enormous potential to stimulate economic growth and lift standards of living, yet can also present risks when key safety considerations are omitted in the design or construction phases.

Preventive risk identification measures, such as road safety audits carried out at the detailed design and pre-opening stages of new or rehabilitated roads, offer a well-established and cost-effective tool to independently review the safety characteristics of road projects, as acknowledged by the World Bank. Considering the MDBs' development agenda, their ability to leverage public and private sector funds, and their strong ties with national road authorities, the IRF supports the mandatory introduction of, and associated funding for, road safety audits linked to all new MDB road investment loans.

Roads built today are durable assets whose lifespan typically span several decades, over which time the mix and volume of traffic is likely to evolve to a considerable extent creating new safety hazards. To prepare for these changes, road agencies must ensure regular road safety inspections are conducted. Road agencies must also retain well-trained staff with access to up-to-date knowledge resources to implement the findings of these inspections. The IRF encourages road agencies receiving MDB road investment loans to conduct a training gap analysis to determine immediate up-skilling needs, and develop a continuing road safety education program for their staff.

More Information

Mike Dreznes
IRF Executive Vice President

+1 703 535 1001

mdreznes@IRF.global

International Road Federation
Madison Place
500 Montgomery Street
Fifth Floor
Alexandria, VA 22314
USA